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Henry v. British Columbia: Still 
Seeking a Just Approach to Damages  
for Wrongful Conviction 
Dr. Emma Cunliffe* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General) was the first case in 
which a claimant sought damages under section 24(1) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breaches of rights that led to a 
wrongful conviction and imprisonment.1 In its 2015 decision, the Supreme 
Court of Canada clarified the criteria for the award and quantum of such 
damages.2 In June 2016, Hinkson C.J.S.C. awarded $8,086,691.80 in 
damages to Ivan Henry in compensation, special damages and “to serve 
both the vindication and deterrence functions of s. 24(1) of the Charter”.3 
This award reflected Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s findings that: Crown Counsel 
intentionally withheld relevant information from Henry in breach of his 
Charter rights; the wrongful non-disclosure seriously infringed Henry’s 
Charter rights; and if Henry had received the disclosure “the likely result 
would have been his acquittal at his 1983 trial, and certainly the avoidance 
of his sentencing as a dangerous offender.”4  
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1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2015 SCC 24 
(S.C.C.), revg [2014] B.C.J. No. 71 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Henry v. British Columbia”]. 
3  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2016] B.C.J. No. 1160, 2016 BCSC 
1038, at para. 473 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Henry 2016 BCSC”].  
4  Id., at para. 472. 
144 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
In this article, I describe the events that led to Ivan Henry’s civil case 
against British Columbia, and explain the interlocutory decisions that 
shaped the passage of that civil case. I attend particularly to two difficult 
issues: the role of demonstrable factual innocence in a trial for Charter 
damages; and the challenges of affording constitutional rights to sexual 
assault complainants in a civil case that arises from wrongful conviction. 
Ultimately, I suggest that the Henry case illustrates the inadequacies in 
the Canadian approach to post-conviction review and compensation for 
wrongful convictions. In lieu of the adversarial process adopted in 
Henry, inquiries such as the one conducted by Justice Peter Cory in the 
Sophonow case offer a model that holds greater potential for doing justice 
to those whose lives and rights may be affected by a wrongful conviction. 
II. R. V. HENRY AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS 
Ivan Henry was arrested on July 29, 1982. Initially charged with  
17 sexual offences, he was tried and convicted of 10 counts in respect of 
eight complainants. On November 24, 1983, he was declared a dangerous 
offender and sentenced to indefinite detention.5 Henry represented himself 
at trial, cross-examining the seven complainants who testified, offering his 
own testimony, and calling witnesses. Prior to trial, he repeatedly sought — 
and was denied — disclosure of information including complainant 
statements and forensic evidence.6 The trial judge described Henry’s work 
in court as follows: 
Throughout all the proceedings in this Court, Henry refused any legal 
assistance and defended himself. No one suggested he was unfit to 
stand trial before the jury. Nonetheless, during that trial and during the 
dangerous offender proceedings he exhibited peculiar behaviour in the 
way he conducted his defence. Repeated suggestions by me that he 
obtain legal advice went unheeded.7 
                                                                                                                       
5  R. v. Henry, [1983] B.C.J. No. 375 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Henry 1983”]. Henry 
remained in prison until June 12, 2009. 
6  Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 156-180. On two occasions prior to Henry’s 
conviction, judges denied applications by Henry for further disclosure. Chief Justice Hinkson held 
that these judicial decisions did not provide Crown Counsel with judicial imprimatur for his 
decisions to withhold disclosure. Id., at paras. 238-244. In Henry v. British Columbia, Moldaver J. 
held that no liability for Charter damages would arise if a court rules that information sought by the 
defence need not be disclosed. Supra, note 2, at para. 91. 
7  Henry 1983, supra, note 5, at para. 3. 
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Although Henry was treated by the Canadian legal system as fit to 
stand trial, the psychiatric evidence presented on sentencing suggested 
that Henry suffered from psychosis and thought disorders, and that he 
was paranoid.8 In 2009, granting an application to re-open Henry’s 
appeal from conviction, Saunders J.A. observed that “Mr. Henry’s fitness 
at trial … may bear upon the fairness of the trial.”9 In 2016, Hinkson 
C.J.S.C. held on the basis of expert evidence that “Mr. Henry was 
mentally destabilized at the time he was making important decisions 
about trial matters, including legal representation.”10 Characterizing 
Henry as “falling within the thin skull category” of plaintiffs, Hinkson 
C.J.S.C. held that he “should not be made to bear the consequences of his 
conduct once it is established that he was wrongfully injured”.11 
Henry maintained his innocence from the time he was first 
interviewed by police12 and throughout his trial. While Henry’s case is 
now understood as having turned on the reliability of identification 
evidence, the trial judge characterized Henry’s “main defence” as the 
proposition that the charged offences had not occurred.13 Henry also 
testified that he had never participated in a police line-up viewed by  
six of the complainants.14 He tendered into evidence the notorious 
photograph of himself handcuffed among a group of smiling foils, in 
which he was being restrained in a headlock by one uniformed officer 
and was flanked by two others. Henry suggested that the photograph had 
been doctored. In his instructions to the jury, Bouck J. stated: “Henry 
wanted you to draw the inference that any identification of him is a farce, 
                                                                                                                       
8  Id., at para. 16. 
9  R. v. Henry, [2009] B.C.J. No. 46, 2009 BCCA 12, at para. 19 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Henry 2009 BCCA”]. See also R. v. Henry, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2072, 2010 BCCA 462, at para. 33 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Henry 2010 BCCA”]; Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 
[2015] B.C.J. No. 3087, 2015 BCSC 2319, at paras. 69, 83 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Henry v. British 
Columbia, Fourth Amended Notice of Civil Claim”]. 
10  Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at para. 71.  
11  Id., at para. 292. See also para. 69, id., citing Janiak v. Ippolito, [1985] S.C.J. No. 5, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 146, at 159, (S.C.C.). 
12  Joan McEwen, Innocence on Trial: The Framing of Ivan Henry (Victoria, B.C.: Heritage 
House Publishing, 2014), at 22-28 [hereinafter “McEwen”]. Further information regarding the 
investigation is supplied in Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 3-12. 
13  Id., at 108. In 2009, the BC Court of Appeal stated that “[i]dentification was virtually the 
only issue” at trial: Henry 2009 BCCA, supra, note 9. By 2010, the Court characterized the case as 
one in which the “only issue … was the identity of the offender”: Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, 
at para. 1. 
14  Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 61; McEwen, id., at 72. 
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since he’s the only one being restrained by three police officers.”15 
Crown counsel argued in turn that Henry’s refusal to participate in the 
line-up could be taken as evidence of his consciousness of guilt.16  
Henry immediately appealed both his conviction and sentence. The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed those appeals for want of 
prosecution in 1984, and an application for leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada was also dismissed.17 Throughout his time in 
prison, Henry continued to seek avenues for review of his convictions 
and/or the exercise of the prerogative of mercy — the Supreme Court of 
Canada reported that he filed more than 50 applications between 1984 
and 2005.18 He sought, and was denied, leave to apply to the Supreme 
Court of Canada on at least four further occasions.19 
In 2002, the Vancouver Police Department began to re-investigate  
25 sexual assaults that had been committed between April 1983 and July 
1988. Henry was in prison when these assaults were committed.20 Police 
eventually relied on DNA evidence to link three of these sexual assaults 
to a Vancouver man who was subsequently named as Donald McCrae.21 
The degree of similarity between the modus operandi used by McCrae 
and that attributed to Henry has been variously reported by judges. In 
2009, Newbury J.A. identified that eight of the sexual assaults committed 
after Henry’s incarceration “involved a similar modus operendi [sic] to 
that used by the perpetrator of the assaults for which Mr. Henry was 
convicted, and took place in the same Vancouver neighbourhoods.”22  
                                                                                                                       
15  McEwen, id., at 108-109. The British Columbia Court of Appeal characterized this 
instruction as “a faint presentation of a strong point for the defence, namely, that the pre-trial 
identification process was flawed and seriously called into question the reliability of all other 
identification evidence.” Henry 2010 BCCA, id., at para. 69. 
16  The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that this argument, and Bouck J.’s instruction 
regarding consciousness of guilt, were wrong in law. Henry 2010 BCCA, id., at paras. 40-69, citing 
R. v. Marcoux, [1976] S.C.J. No. 54, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763, 60 D.L.R. (3d) 119 (S.C.C.), affg [1973] 
O.J. No. 2104 (Ont. C.A.). 
17  R. v. Henry, [1983] B.C.J. No. 2204 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Henry, [1984] S.C.C.A. No. 262, 
55 N.R. 157 (S.C.C.). 
18  Supra, note 2, at para. 15. A partial list of these applications is supplied in Henry 2016 
BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 26-34. 
19  R. v. Henry, [1990] S.C.C.A. No. 334 (S.C.C.); R. v. Henry, [1991] S.C.C.A. No. 205 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Henry, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 77 (S.C.C.); Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 152 (S.C.C.). 
20  Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 25. 
21  R. v. Henry, [2009] B.C.J. No. 337, 2009 BCCA 86 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Henry, [2012] 
B.C.J. No. 1932, 2012 BCCA 374 (B.C.C.A.). 
22  R. v. Henry, [2009] B.C.J. No. 337, 2009 BCCA 86, at para. 2 (B.C.C.A.). 
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In 2010, a three-member panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
reheard more extensive arguments made by Henry and the Crown in 
respect of whether the offences attributed to McCrae, or the 25 post-arrest 
offences as a whole, exhibited such distinctive similarities to those 
attributed to Henry that they must have been committed by the same 
person. Justice Low concluded on behalf of the panel: 
In addition, in considering similarities it is also necessary to take 
dissimilarities into account. There is at least one dissimilar circumstance 
here that would be potentially significant to a trial judge ruling on 
admissibility or to the trier of fact if the evidence were admitted. Four 
of the complainants at the appellant’s trial testified that the assailant 
used the term “ripped off” and a fifth said that the intruder told her that 
a woman named Valerie had taken money from his boss. This specific 
ruse does not appear in the particulars of the [25 post-Henry arrest] 
Smallman offences.  
..... 
In my opinion, it cannot be said that the Smallman evidence, whether 
viewed in broad focus or in narrow focus by being confined to the 
known conduct of D.M., leads one to conclude that the appellant is 
innocent of the offences for which he was convicted. It does not 
exonerate him. At best, it is evidence that might be admitted at a new 
trial under the law relating to other suspects, not on the basis that it 
disproves the element of identity, but on the basis that it is capable of 
raising a reasonable doubt on that issue.23 
While unable to conclude that the evidence exonerated Henry, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal reversed his convictions, entered acquittals on 
each count, and set aside the dangerous offender designation.  
The British Columbia Court of Appeal’s 2010 decision identifies 
numerous errors and inadequacies in Henry’s trial.24 The Court held that 
the verdict on each count was not one that a properly instructed jury 
acting judicially could have rendered. In particular, the evidence put 
before the British Columbia Court of Appeal suggested that the “Crown’s 
case on the element of identification rests entirely on the in-court 
identification made by the complainants at the preliminary hearing and at 
trial. Pre-court identification was fraught with problems”.25 Expanding 
on this observation, the Court held: 
                                                                                                                       
23  Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at paras. 149, 151. 
24  These inadequacies are summarized, id., at para. 154. 
25  Id., at para. 109. 
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Eyewitness identification of a stranger is inherently frail for the reasons 
given in the cases. Pre-court identification of the appellant by the 
complainants in the present case ranged from tentative to non-existent. 
One complainant did not participate in pre-court identification exercise. 
The photographic line-up was fatally unfair. The physical line-up 
should not have been conducted at all because, to use the description 
given in Marcoux, it became a farce.26  
Accordingly, Henry’s convictions were quashed and a verdict of acquittal 
was entered on each count. 
In June 2011, Henry filed a civil suit against British Columbia, the 
City of Vancouver, several named police officers and the Attorney-
General of Canada. This claim sought damages from each defendant in 
respect of its role in the criminal investigation, trial, or post-conviction. 
In late 2015, Henry reached confidential settlements with Vancouver 
(incorporating the named police officers) and the Attorney-General of 
Canada. These settlement agreements were reached in the middle of 
Henry’s civil trial, after the plaintiff had closed his case and partway 
through Vancouver’s anticipated evidence.27 Consequently, the only 
claim that remained before Hinkson C.J.S.C. in the British Columbia 
Supreme Court was Henry’s claim against British Columbia.  
Henry’s claim against the province focused on the conduct of Crown 
counsel before, during and after Henry’s trial, and particularly on the 
failure to disclose investigative material including some complainant 
statements, information about material collected from the crime scenes, 
and forensic evidence. It raised the novel question of when and according 
to what criteria Charter damages should be awarded for a breach of the 
prosecutorial duty to make disclosure to a criminal defendant. Before this 
claim was heard on its merits, it was the subject of an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. In Henry v. British Columbia,28 the Supreme 
Court of Canada set out the test for Charter damages arising from an 
alleged failure on the part of the Crown to make disclosure in a criminal 
proceeding. Having clarified the test, the Supreme Court of Canada 
remitted the case to the British Columbia Supreme Court for trial.  
                                                                                                                       
26  Id., at para. 139. 
27  One trial complainant was scheduled to testify on the morning that Henry’s settlement 
with Vancouver was announced. In light of the settlement, her testimony did not proceed. Ian 
Mulgrew, “Woman who ID’d Henry to testify; J.F.” Vancouver Sun (November 16, 2015), at A3; 
Ian Mulgrew, “City settles with Ivan Henry for wrongful conviction; Ottawa and the province ask 
for adjournment” Vancouver Sun (November 17, 2015), at A1. 
28  Supra, note 2. 
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III. HENRY V. BRITISH COLUMBIA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
In Henry v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified 
the circumstances in which Charter damages should be awarded for a 
Crown prosecutor’s failure to make disclosure to a criminal defendant.29 
Justice Moldaver held on behalf of a majority that:  
… a cause of action will lie where the Crown, in breach of its 
constitutional obligations, causes harm to the accused by intentionally 
withholding information when it knows, or would reasonably be 
expected to know, that the information is material to the defence and 
that the failure to disclose will likely impinge on the accused’s ability 
to make full answer and defence.30 
Justice Moldaver set out four elements that must be proven by a claimant 
at trial: that the prosecutor intentionally withheld information;31 the 
prosecutor knew or ought reasonably to have known that the information 
was material and that failure to disclose would likely impinge on full 
answer and defence; the withholding breached the claimant’s Charter 
rights; and that the claimant suffered harm as a result of the withholding.32  
In order to recover Charter damages, it is not necessary for the claimant 
to prove that the failure to disclose caused a wrongful conviction, or that 
the claimant is factually innocent. However, Moldaver J. also suggested 
that evidence of factual innocence may go to quantum: 
… a claimant must prove that, as a result of the wrongful non-
disclosure, he or she suffered a legally cognizable harm. Liability 
attaches to the Crown only upon a finding of “but-for” causation.  
In cases involving wrongful convictions, this “but-for” test avoids the 
thorny issue of whether or not factual innocence is required — that is, 
proof that the accused did not in fact commit the crimes alleged. 
Instead, the focus of the inquiry is on the proceedings that occurred at 
the time of the intentional failure to disclose. That said, without 
deciding the issue, I would not foreclose the possibility that evidence of 
factual innocence or guilt could go to the quantum of damages.33 
                                                                                                                       
29  Id. 
30  Id., at para. 31. 
31  This element will be satisfied upon proof that the prosecutor was in possession of the 
information and failed to disclose it, or upon proof that the prosecutor was put on notice of the 
existence of the information and failed to obtain possession of it, in contravention of disclosure obligations. 
Id., at para. 86. 
32  Id., at para. 85. 
33  Id., at para. 95. 
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Chief Justice McLachlin and Karakatsanis J. would have adopted a more 
lenient standard than that which was set out by Moldaver J. for the 
majority. They held that a claim for Charter damages for wrongful non-
disclosure should be assessed according to the four-part test originally set 
out in Vancouver (City) v. Ward.34 That is, an applicant must establish a 
Charter breach by the state and must show that damages would serve at 
least one of the functions of compensation, vindication or deterrence. 
Upon proof of these two criteria, the onus shifts to the state to show that 
Charter damages would be inappropriate or unjust in light of countervailing 
considerations. Finally, if the state’s burden is not discharged, the Court 
should consider the proper quantum of damages.35 Chief Justice 
McLachlin and Karakatsanis J. agreed that a showing of causation was 
necessary to the recovery of compensatory damages. However, they 
expressed doubt about whether the “but-for” test set out by Moldaver J. 
established the appropriate standard.36 
IV. CHARTER DAMAGES AND COMPENSATION FOR  
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: THE “THORNY ISSUE” OF  
FACTUAL INNOCENCE 
The difficulties Henry experienced when seeking review of his 
conviction — and the course of his civil claim for damages — illustrate 
the gaps that persist in the Canadian approach to post-conviction review 
and compensation.37 Before the Supreme Court of Canada, Henry argued 
that the Court should recognize a broad and generous entitlement to 
Charter damages:  
… a claim for Charter damages for non-disclosure resulting in his 
wrongful conviction and imprisonment predicated on … simple Charter 
                                                                                                                       
34  [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.), varg [2009] B.C.J. No. 91 (B.C.C.A.). 
35  Supra, note 2, at para. 107. 
36  Id., at para. 118. 
37  See generally, Kathryn M. Campbell, “Policy Responses to Wrongful Convictions in 
Canada: The Role of Conviction Review, Public Inquiries, and Compensation” (2005) 41 Crim. L. 
Bull. 145; Kent Roach, “The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform, 
or Both?” (2010) 85 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 89; Peter de C. Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas 
Sophonow: The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation 
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Justice, 2001) [hereinafter “Cory”]; Archibald Kaiser, “Wrongful Conviction 
and Imprisonment: Towards an End to the Compensatory Obstacle Course” (1989) 9 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 96 [hereinafter “Kaiser”]; David Hamer, “Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the 
Finality Principle: The Case for a Criminal Cases Review Commission” (2014) 37 U.N.S.W.L.J. 270 
[hereinafter “Hamer”]. 
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breach that seriously infringed the right to disclosure, fair trial rights and 
the ability to make full answer and defence[.]38 
British Columbia argued that the tort of malicious prosecution provided 
an adequate remedy and that it was not necessary to recognize an 
additional cause of action in respect of Charter damages under section 24(1). 
Somewhat ironically, one of the bases on which British Columbia 
resisted Henry’s argument was the under-inclusiveness of the Charter 
remedy.39 British Columbia also relied upon the proposition that most 
nation states that have adopted compensation schemes for wrongful 
conviction have adopted qualifying criteria that include demonstrable 
factual innocence.40 In holding that policy considerations could prevent 
the recovery of Charter damages and that factual innocence might  
be relevant to the quantum of damages, Moldaver J. steered a course 
between these positions.41 However, disputes about the proper role of 
arguments about factual innocence predate Henry v. British Columbia, 
and they have persisted in the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision.  
In 1988, the Federal-Provincial Ministers Responsible for Criminal 
Justice adopted Guidelines on Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted 
and Imprisoned Persons.42 These Guidelines provide that “compensation 
should only be granted to persons who did not commit the crimes of 
which they were convicted.”43 However, the Guidelines have never been 
passed into legislation and Hinkson C.J.S.C. concluded that “most 
contemporary compensation awards have departed in some respects 
from” them.44 The Model Legislation promulgated by the U.S. Innocence 
Project to govern claims for wrongful conviction also conditions 
compensation on a showing of demonstrable innocence. Section 4.A.2 of 
that Model Legislation provides that: 
In order to obtain a judgment in his or her favor, claimant must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
..... 
                                                                                                                       
38  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Supreme Court of Canada file no. 35745, 
factum of the appellant, at para. 5. See also para. 8. 
39  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Supreme Court of Canada file no. 35745, 
factum of the respondent, Attorney General of British Columbia, at paras. 106-108. 
40  Id., at para. 112. 
41  Supra, note 2, at para. 95. 
42  Reproduced as Appendix A to Kaiser, supra, note 37, at 152-53. 
43  Id., at 152, 153. 
44  Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at para. 376. 
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2. Claimant did not commit any of the crimes charged in the 
accusatory instrument … .45 
A 2012 review of U.S. legislation that provided for compensation for the 
wrongfully convicted concluded that 89 per cent of such statutes imposed 
burdens of proving factual innocence (from “a preponderance of the 
evidence” to “clear and convincing evidence”) on those who sought 
compensation.46  
When determining the quantum of Henry’s damages, Hinkson C.J.S.C. 
held “I do not find foreign legislative schemes to be of assistance.”47  
In describing the proper approach to quantum,48 Hinkson C.J.S.C. did not 
analyze whether evidence of factual innocence is relevant. In particular, he 
did not cite or expressly consider whether to apply Moldaver J.’s comment 
that evidence of factual guilt or innocence may be relevant to quantum.49 
Debra Parkes and I have recently supplied a review of the concept and 
limits of wrongful convictions, with particular attention to the role of 
demonstrable factual innocence.50 We argue that the emphasis on factual 
innocence is partly attributable to the role of DNA exonerations in the 
work of Innocence Projects. However, we also identify that certain 
classes of criminal defendants — including women who are improperly 
denied access to the defence of self-defence and those who are accused 
of crimes that may never have occurred, such as infant death cases in 
which causation is contested — may be less able to discharge a burden of 
proving factual innocence.  
The difficulties of proof that arise when factual innocence must be 
established are also evident in the Henry case. I have already noted that 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal declined to exonerate Henry. 
Specifically, Low J.A. said that “it cannot be said that the Smallman 
evidence … leads one to conclude that the appellant is innocent of the 
offences for which he was convicted.”51 Vancouver Police failed to retain 
physical evidence that had the potential to exonerate or implicate Henry, 
                                                                                                                       
45  Innocence Project, Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure 
and How to Provide Fair Compensation, Appendix B, online: <http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf>. 
46  Robert J. Norris, “Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted” (2012) 
23:3 Criminal Justice Policy Review 352, at 364. 
47  Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at para. 412. 
48  Id., at paras. 409-413, 445, 448 and 455. 
49  Henry v. British Columbia, supra, note 2, at para. 95. 
50  Debra Parkes & Emma Cunliffe, “Women and Wrongful Convictions: Concepts and 
Challenges” (2015) 11:3 International Journal of Law in Context 219. 
51  Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 151. 
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McCrae or some third person in some or all of the offences with which 
Henry was charged. The existence of this evidence was not disclosed to 
Henry before, during or until long after his trial. Henry has emphasized 
that this non-disclosure and destruction of evidence deprived him of an 
opportunity to prove his innocence.52  
Vancouver Sun columnist Ian Mulgrew, who believes that Henry is 
innocent,53 was the only journalist who covered the civil trial on behalf 
of the Vancouver Sun. Mulgrew argued that it was ignoble of the 
defendants to assert that Henry may not be factually innocent.54 Henry’s 
counsel, John Laxton, was reported as having said in court that if 
Vancouver defended itself on the basis that Henry committed the 
underlying offences, and failed in that defence, Henry would seek “a 
very large award of punitive damages”.55 When Vancouver settled with 
Henry, by the terms of that settlement it “unequivocally” withdrew “each 
and every allegation made by it in its pleadings and in its opening 
statement that Henry committed the crimes of which he was acquitted.”56  
Notwithstanding the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s conclusion 
that the Smallman evidence did not exonerate Henry, Henry relied 
heavily on evidence of McCrae’s activities in his notice of claim.57 The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal identified the legal consequences of 
such evidence, had it been led at Henry’s trial: 
… the Smallman material contains evidence of the propensity of 
another suspect. If this evidence were admitted, it would open up the 
possibility of the Crown leading reply evidence as to the circumstances 
of certain criminal conduct by the appellant in Manitoba in 1976.  
It would also possibly lead to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by 
                                                                                                                       
52  Henry v. British Columbia, Fourth Amended Notice of Civil Claim, supra, note 9, at 
paras. 15-17, 51(c), 52, 58, 62-64, 67-68, 88, 94-98, 102-103. 
53  Ian Mulgrew, “26 years in jail for suspect convictions; Add a Vancouver man’s name to 
the sadly growing list of wrongly convicted Canadians” Vancouver Sun (January 10, 2009), at A10. 
54  For example: Ian Mulgrew, “Decades of wrongful imprisonment weigh heavily on Ivan 
Henry: Suing for compensation” Vancouver Sun (July 19, 2014), at A8; Ian Mulgrew, “Ivan Henry case 
shows government cannot be trusted; Call for change” Vancouver Sun (August 31, 2015), at A1. 
55  Ian Mulgrew, “Ivan Henry under attack, again; Wrongful conviction” Vancouver Sun 
(October 23, 2015), at A6.  
56  Ian Mulgrew, “City settles with Ivan Henry for wrongful conviction; Ottawa and the 
province ask for adjournment” Vancouver Sun (November 17, 2015), at A1. 
57  Henry v. British Columbia, Fourth Amended Notice of Civil Claim, supra, note 9, at 
paras. 18, 19, 20, 31, 34, 59, 64, 68, 97-100. Henry also points to the fact that certain police 
activities, such as a wiretap, tracking device and fluorescent powder test, did not yield inculpatory 
evidence, e.g., id., at paras. 32-39. Recognizing that physical evidence in the possession of the 
Vancouver Police Department was destroyed, I presume that if other evidence of Henry’s factual 
innocence existed or had been found, it would be identified in Henry’s notice of claim. 
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the appellant in 2006 referencing a letter he wrote in 1994 in which he 
admitted breaking into a house in Vancouver on 14 January 1982, 
confronting a woman present and telling her that he “was looking for 
someone who had ripped me off on a drug deal ...” but with no assault 
ensuing.58 
The convictions and letter referenced in this paragraph, along with a 
1973 conviction for possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose,59 
suggest that Henry’s criminal history included break, enter and assault 
against women, carrying a weapon between the hours of 1:00 and 5:00 a.m., 
and using the “rip off”  claim in the course of committing a break and 
enter. Differences also arise: for example, most of these offences occurred 
in Winnipeg rather than Vancouver and the weapon Henry carried in 
1973 was a rifle rather than a knife. A closer analysis of similarities and 
differences would, of course, require consideration of the proven facts 
and underlying records. In a criminal trial, Henry’s claim that McCrae 
committed the charged offences would likely lead to the admission of 
this evidence of Henry’s past acts.60 However, such admission would be 
accompanied by a judicial warning about the proper use of this evidence. 
By observing that Henry’s factual innocence is not manifest, I do not 
intend to minimize the wrongs perpetuated by State actors in this case.  
If one cleaves (as I do) to the view that Charter rights have inherent value, 
one must accept the correlate that any person is entitled to the protection of 
those rights, regardless of factual innocence. As Susan Bandes has argued: 
The notion of fair process, as distinguished from the notion of fair 
results in particular cases, is always a hard sell. The notion of process is 
abstract, complex, and not very media friendly. The notion that a 
process needed to protect the innocent will unavoidably protect the 
guilty on occasion is a sophisticated notion. An even harder sell is the 
idea that all suspects ... should receive fair process, not just as a 
windfall but because our constitutional protections are not meant to 
protect only the innocent.61 
                                                                                                                       
58  Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 150. For further information about the 1976 
charges, see R. v. Henry, [1977] M.J. No. 52 (Man. C.A.). A lengthy extract from the 1994 letter 
written by Henry is reproduced by McEwen, supra, note 12, at 159. 
59  R. v. Henry, [1973] M.J. No. 173, at para. 7 (Man. Co. Ct.). 
60  See Sidney N. Lederman et al., The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Markham, ON: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2014), at 10.104-10.109; R. v. McMillan, [1977] S.C.J. No. 32, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 
824 (S.C.C.), affg [1975] O.J. No. 2247, 7 O.R. (2d) 750 (Ont. C.A.). 
61  Susan Bandes, “Framing Wrongful Convictions” (2008) 1 Utah L. Rev. 5, at 16. See also 
Hamer, supra, note 37, at 274: “it would be counterproductive to deny that convictions of the legally 
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On this conception, it is possible to see Henry as ill-treated and the 
process of investigating and convicting him as deeply flawed, while 
reserving judgment about the question of underlying factual innocence. 
Mulgrew’s columns in the Vancouver Sun and the Henry legal team’s 
reported strategy of responding with indignation whenever the question 
of guilt or innocence is raised resists the distinction that Bandes draws 
between process rights and underlying criminal responsibility. Justice 
Moldaver was seemingly seeking to avoid this type of conflation when 
he held in Henry v. British Columbia that proof of causation did not 
depend on a showing of factual innocence.62  
As the Henry civil trial proceeded in the British Columbia Supreme 
Court, the question of factual innocence became more complicated.  
In a ruling issued early in the trial, Hinkson C.J.S.C. held that several 
paragraphs of the 2010 British Columbia Court of Appeal decision “are 
findings that were necessarily determined in the proceedings in  
that Court and are binding on both the plaintiff and the Province as 
between them”.63 The enumerated paragraphs relate to the adequacy of 
identification evidence, the admission of the photograph of the line-up, 
the adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions, and the manner in which 
the pre-trial identification procedure tainted the identification evidence.  
In Toronto (City) v. CUPE, Local 79, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held:  
Properly understood and applied, the doctrines of res judicata and 
abuse of process govern the interplay between different judicial 
decision makers. These rules and principles call for a judicial balance 
between finality, fairness, efficiency and authority of judicial decisions.64 
Toronto v. CUPE focused on the question of whether a person convicted  
of sexual assault and dismissed from his employment as a result could  
have his employment reinstated by an arbitrator on the basis that the 
sexual assault did not occur. Justice Arbour held on behalf of the  
 
                                                                                                                       
62  Supra, note 2, at para. 95. See also Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 41, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C., at para. 64 and Charron J. 
(dissenting), at paras. 156-161, affg [2005] O.J. No. 4045 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hill v. Hamilton-
Wentworth”]. 
63  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] B.C.J. No. 2141, 2015 BCSC 
1798, at para. 16 (B.C.S.C.). 
64  Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), Local 79, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 64, 2003 SCC 63, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), affg [2001] O.J. No. 3239 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Toronto v. CUPE”]. 
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majority that permitting relitigation of a question that had been 
conclusively determined by a criminal court would constitute an abuse of 
process. She concluded that this principle would hold whether the party 
is a plaintiff or defendant in the subsequent civil proceeding.65 While 
recognizing a general rule against relitigation, she held that in certain 
circumstances relitigation may enhance the credibility and effectiveness 
of the justice system. These circumstances included “when fairness 
dictates that the result should not be binding in the new context”.66 The 
question therefore arises whether the principles identified by Arbour J. 
hold when the criminal court has acquitted a defendant. 
In her dissenting reasons in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth, Charron J. 
identified the challenges that arise when the shift is made from criminal 
acquittal to civil trial: 
It is a principle of fundamental justice that the accused in a criminal 
trial be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Therefore, from a 
criminal law perspective, there is no question that an acquittal must be 
regarded as tantamount to a finding of innocence. However, in the 
context of a tort action, we must come to terms with the reality that the 
person who committed the offence may well stand to benefit rather than 
lose from a botched-up investigation. The true victim in such cases is 
not the suspect but the public at large. Should the successful accused 
who actually committed the offence be entitled to use the acquittal 
brought about by the negligent conduct of police investigators as a 
basis to claim compensation?67  
Justice Charron proceeds to offer the example of a victim of a brutal 
sexual assault who offers a firm identification in circumstances in which 
the police fail to follow the correct identification procedure. The accused 
is properly acquitted because the frailties inherent to eyewitness evidence 
mean that there must be a reasonable doubt. Justice Charron then 
contemplates a civil case in which the accused — now the plaintiff — 
sues in tort: 
How is the civil claim to be adjudicated? Is the acquittal to be 
considered as the legal equivalent of factual innocence in the civil trial 
thereby precluding the defendant from [defending itself on the basis 
that the accused in fact committed the underlying crime]? … [I]f he is 
in fact the assailant, many would view it as unthinkable that his loss 
                                                                                                                       
65  Id., at para. 49. 
66  Id., at para. 52. 
67  Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth, supra, note 62, at para. 161.  
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should be regarded as compensable at law, given that the true victim 
who was harmed as a result of the police officer’s substandard conduct 
was society, not the plaintiff.68 
Justice Charron also identifies that placing a burden on an acquitted 
defendant to prove factual innocence could also be unjust: “Meeting this 
burden may prove impossible to do. … It would also necessitate a retrial 
of the case which may well lead to conflicting findings and put an aura of 
suspicion on his acquittal.”69 The majority declined to decide whether an 
acquittal should be treated as conclusive proof of innocence, but noted 
that in the United States, a victim may recover damages against an 
accused who has been acquitted at criminal trial.70  
Chief Justice Hinkson’s reasons regarding issue estoppel do not 
expressly consider whether principles developed in the context of 
challenging a criminal conviction apply with equal force to the context in 
which a criminal defendant has been acquitted after a lengthy period of 
imprisonment.71 However, based on the discussion in Hill v. Hamilton-
Wentworth, it seems at least arguable that the burdens and standards of 
proof play out differently in this context.  
In his decision awarding Charter damages, Hinkson C.J.S.C. did not 
reach any conclusion regarding Henry’s underlying guilt or innocence. 
Having reviewed the information that was not disclosed by Crown 
counsel, he identified that the failure to disclose material information 
was compounded by four disclosure-related “inappropriate acts” 
committed by Crown counsel at trial.72 Chief Justice Hinkson concluded: 
… if Crown Counsel had provided Mr. Henry with the documents in 
their control to which he was entitled, and refrained from the four 
inappropriate acts discussed above, that on the balance of probabilities, 
Mr. Henry would not have been convicted of the various counts of 
which he was convicted on March 15, 1983.73 
It is not clear from Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s reasons whether he considers that 
evidence of factual innocence or guilt might be relevant to quantum in a 
different case. 
                                                                                                                       
68  Id., at para. 165. 
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at paras. 17-21 (B.C.S.C.). 
72  Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 266-273. 
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In Part VI, I will briefly return to the role of demonstrable innocence 
in post-conviction review processes. First, however, I wish to consider 
how the British Columbia Supreme Court engaged with the interests of 
the trial complainants throughout the course of Henry v. British 
Columbia. 
V. PROTECTING THE COMPLAINANTS 
There is no question that eight trial complainants, together with a 
larger number of complainants who testified at Henry’s preliminary 
hearing, were sexually assaulted in terrifying circumstances. The seven 
trial complainants who testified at Henry’s trial suffered the further 
ordeal of being cross-examined by an accused who was subsequently 
diagnosed with serious mental illness, whose behaviour was “peculiar”, 
and who denied that they had been assaulted. When declaring Henry to 
be a dangerous offender, Bouck J. observed: 
… I cannot let this aspect of the case pass by without commenting upon 
the courage of the complainants when they came forward and related 
their horrifying experiences. … 
It is devastating enough to be assaulted as they were, but it must be 
equally repulsive for them to endure cross-examination at trial and on 
this application by the very individual who committed these deplorable 
acts. They are to be commended for seeing the matter through to the 
bitter end notwithstanding their obvious wish to try and forget it all and 
begin their lives anew. 
..... 
… At one point in these proceedings, he taunted one of the complainants 
with belittling words when he was trying to cross-examine her at the 
hearing.74 
In 2010, when he concluded that the procedures used by police undermined 
the reliability of the trial complainants’ identification evidence, Low J.A. 
did not impugn the trial complainants’ honesty.75  
After Henry had filed his civil claim, two of the complainants asked 
the British Columbia Supreme Court to take steps to protect their privacy 
and safety during the anticipated case. They requested anonymity 
because, in the words of one complainant “I have specific concerns for 
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my safety.”76 The complainants explained that they and several others 
had been contacted by author and lawyer Joan McEwen (who was 
writing a book about Henry) and that an investigator had used trap and 
trace methods77 to find them. They had not been advised of McEwen’s 
application for access to the Henry trial record, nor of a hearing called on 
a motion to relax the express undertaking imposed on Henry as a 
condition of access to documents that concerned them and their fellow 
complainants. They also told Goepel J. that one of the complainants had 
received “what was considered a threatening letter” from Henry, 
addressed to her at her parents’ house.78  
The first complainant explained: 
We are well aware it is … not advisable to appear without the benefit 
of legal counsel, but we find ourselves in a difficult position as the 
Attorney General who represented our interests in the criminal trial is 
the defendant in this case, and as such cannot offer us advice or 
direction in these complex legal matters.79 
The complainant identified that she and her co-complainants felt they 
were in need of legal representation, and that a court ruling to relax the 
undertaking would “affect a great number of women who need and 
deserve protection.”80 The second complainant explained that the “proposed 
publication ban and sealing of documents has not prevented others from 
accessing our names and using other means to locate us.”81 An affidavit 
sworn by a victim services worker identified that all of the complainants 
were suffering from symptoms of trauma that impacted significantly on 
their lives and health.82 
Justice Goepel expressed sympathy for the complainants’ concerns, 
and identified the extent to which the complainants were necessarily 
involved in the trial ahead:  
                                                                                                                       
76  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Vancouver registry no. S114405, 
transcript of proceedings in Chambers, November 21, 2012, at 83 (B.C.S.C.). 
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I have tremendous sympathy for the position you find yourselves in 
today, having gone through what you undoubtedly went through such a 
long time ago[.] … [I]f a miscarriage of justice took place in this 
matter, and it took place because of the acts, perhaps, of the police 
department or the prosecutors, as has been alleged … you are, by 
necessity, caught up in this matter, and things and statements that you 
may have given so long ago may, unfortunately, be matters which are 
going to … have to come before me.83 
Justice Goepel also voiced concerns about whether counsel for the British 
Columbia Attorney General could or should represent the complainants in 
its work in the civil trial: 
I’m concerned that you’re forced to be wearing two hats … the legal 
complications of the question of [the complainants’] privacy rights, and 
the importance of it, I suspect that it would be most difficult for the 
complainants in their personal capacities to frame the legal issues —  
I appreciate the personal issues. … [T]heir legal position, though, is 
one of extreme complexity. They are caught up in a proceeding … in 
which we have their rights, which are very important rights, being dealt 
with. … I’m concerned that these very important privacy rights, that 
you’re not in a position to argue. You’ve got two – you’re wearing too 
many hats at this point in time.84 
Notwithstanding these observations, the Attorney General declined to 
fund independent legal counsel for the complainants. Ultimately, Goepel J. 
relaxed the implicit undertaking as Henry requested. However, he ruled 
that no counsel could share addresses of the complainants (other than 
addresses at which the assaults occurred) with his or her client except 
with the prior consent of the Attorney General. Justice Goepel observed 
in his reasons that “[f]or the victims of sexual assault to have to relive 
those events after more than 30 years is an almost unimaginable horror.  
It cannot, however, in this case, be avoided. It is a necessary by-product 
of the allegations made in this proceeding.”85 
While Goepel J. clearly accepted that the complainants’ Charter rights 
were implicated in Henry’s civil trial, Hinkson C.J.S.C. issued a decision 
in late 2015 that denied that proposition without providing analysis: 
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The applicant [Vancouver Rape Relief] contends that because the 
plaintiff is seeking damages pursuant to the Charter, his case is a public 
law case, involving the Charter rights of the 1980’s complainants. In 
my view, the Charter rights of the 1980’s complainants are not engaged 
in these proceedings.86  
Which of these characterizations is correct? Henry’s claim against British 
Columbia included a claim for damages for breach of Henry’s Charter 
rights before, during and after his trial for sexual offences. The impugned 
rights include the right to disclosure, full answer and defence, liberty and 
security of the person. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly 
emphasized that the “principles of fundamental justice reflect a spectrum 
of interests, from the rights of the accused to broader societal concerns”.87 
In particular, society has legitimate interests in encouraging sexual 
assault victims to report crime and protecting witnesses’ privacy. “[F]ailure 
to consider the position of the complainant in the trial process may have 
the opposite effect.”88  
In R. v. Mills, the Supreme Court of Canada drew a direct connection 
between an accused person’s Charter right to disclosure and the Charter 
rights of sexual assault complainants, emphasizing the relationship 
between privacy, equality and dignity. The majority held: 
In this respect, an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the context 
of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the boundaries of 
full answer and defence. As we have already discussed, the right to 
make full answer and defence does not include the right to information 
that would only distort the truth-seeking goal of the trial process.89  
In R. v. Osolin, Cory J. held on behalf of a majority that “A complainant 
should not be unduly harassed and pilloried to the extent of becoming a 
victim of an insensitive judicial system.”90 In R. v. O’Connor, a case that 
also considers the right to production of records, all judges agreed that 
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complainants have a constitutional right to privacy. Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé observed: 
Equally relevant, for our purposes, is Lamer J.’s recognition91 … that 
the right to security of the person encompasses the right to be protected 
against psychological trauma. In the context of his discussion of the 
effects on an individual of unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of 
the Charter, he noted that such trauma could take the form of 
stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stress and anxiety 
resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of 
family, social life and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to the outcome 
and sanction. 
If the word “complainant” were substituted for the word “accused” in 
the above extract, I think that we would have an excellent description 
of the psychological traumas potentially faced by sexual assault 
complainants.92  
The complainants’ submissions to Goepel J. demonstrate the adverse 
impact of the Henry case on the complainants’ privacy and security of 
the person.  
When the case came before the Supreme Court of Canada, several 
complainants sought leave to intervene in order to make submissions 
about how the Court should have regard to the Charter rights of sexual 
assault complainants in assessing a claim for Charter damages for non-
disclosure in this context.93 In making this argument, the complainants 
relied on R. v. Mills94 and on the statement in Vancouver (City) v. Ward 
that the section 24(1) Charter damages remedy must be developed with 
careful regard to the existing balance of interests and policy 
considerations.95 Justice Karakatsanis denied the application to intervene 
on the basis that “it would not be appropriate to allow these applicants, 
who are potential participants in the underlying proceedings, to be 
involved in this appeal.”96 Justice Goepel’s concerns about which parties 
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No. 3311 (Ont. C.A.). 
92  R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at 483 (S.C.C.), affg [1994] 
B.C.J. No. 702 (B.C.C.A.). 
93  Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Supreme Court of Canada file no. 35745, 
factum of the interveners, Jane Doe #1 - #6. 
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were in a position to protect the Charter rights of the complainants are 
arguably substantiated by the fact that no other party or intervener made 
the arguments that had been offered by the complainants. 
Over the course of the civil trial, the complainants’ concerns about the 
extent to which the court and the parties will protect their privacy and 
dignity have been realized. An object lesson is offered by the Vancouver 
Sun’s coverage of the case — and particularly its characterization of the 
role of trial complainant JF — and the Court’s failure to supervise that 
reporting. Ian Mulgrew describes JF as “the real catalyst behind the 
miscarriage of justice” and “the only reason Henry was charged”. He has 
quoted a police description of her as “very attractive” and reproduced in 
full a letter sent by JF to a police officer, while describing that letter as 
“veritably tear stained”.97 He has identified JF’s geographic location and 
named a friend of JF’s.  
It seems highly likely that Mulgrew supplied enough information for 
some readers to identify JF. To the best of my knowledge, neither  
the lawyers nor Hinkson C.J.S.C. has raised the question of whether the 
Vancouver Sun’s reporting was fair and accurate, nor considered the 
impact of such characterizations (in and out of court) on the Charter 
rights of the complainants in this case and on the willingness of other 
women to report sexual assault. JF was scheduled to testify in Henry’s 
trial on the day that Vancouver announced its settlement with Henry. As a 
result of the fact and timing of that settlement, she was deprived of the 
opportunity to respond to claims made inside the courtroom and in the 
media about her role in Henry’s wrongful conviction.  
It is in this context that Vancouver Rape Relief applied in November 
2015 for standing to bring an application for the appointment of amicus 
curiae in the Henry trial. Vancouver Rape Relief argued that amicus 
curiae was necessary to make submissions on the proper approach to 
factual innocence and to protect the Charter rights of the complainants. 
Recall that the Supreme Court of Canada had denied the complainants 
standing to intervene because their role in the case disqualified them. In 
light of this prior decision, it is ironic that Hinkson C.J.S.C. denied 
Vancouver Rape Relief standing on the basis that notwithstanding its 
lengthy history of assisting and advocating on behalf of sexual assault 
complainants, it had “no stake in these proceedings, nor does it purport to 
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represent any of the 1980’s complainants”.98 Furthermore, evidently 
overlooking the fact that this is the first case in which a plaintiff has 
sought Charter damages for wrongful conviction, Hinkson C.J.S.C. noted 
that Vancouver Rape Relief’s “work does not normally include 
intervention in claims for Charter damages by those who assert that they 
have been wrongfully convicted of a criminal offence”.99  
Justice Karakatsanis’s decision to deny the complainants standing and 
Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s decision to deny standing to Vancouver Rape Relief 
leads me to think that the courts’ approach to hearing from those who 
would represent the interests of sexual assault complainants is at best like 
that of Goldilocks to eating porridge — but with only two bowls, neither 
of which is “just right”. Unfortunately, in the result, no party or lawyer 
was tasked with ensuring that the complainants’ Charter rights and 
interests were considered while assessing the Crown’s duty to make 
disclosure circa 1983 or in crafting a just approach to quantifying Charter 
damages for wrongful conviction. These rights and interests were not 
actively safeguarded within the court process and media reporting about 
the trial. 
Chief Justice Hinkson’s final decision engaged at considerable length 
with the complainants’ statements and their testimony at trial.100 In his 
decision, Hinkson C.J.S.C. concluded that there were “many inconsistencies 
in the undisclosed evidence relating to each of the complainants” that “had 
the potential to seriously undermine the identifications they made”.101 
Because of the Crown’s non-disclosure, Henry was deprived of the 
opportunity to cross-examine the complainants about these matters during 
his 1983 trial.  
Most of the inconsistencies identified by Hinkson C.J.S.C. relate to the 
complainants’ description of their attackers’ voice and appearance. Some 
seem to have substantial probative value.102 Other matters characterized by 
Hinkson C.J.S.C. as inconsistencies seem rather semantic.103 Overall, 
Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s reasons leave the impression that many or all of the 
complainants were unreliable, or that their testimony was incautious. Had 
the complainants been witnesses in the civil trial, the rule in Browne v. 
Dunn would require that these matters be put to them, and that they be 
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invited to explain any apparent contradictions.104 However, because no 
party called the complainants to testify, the complainants were not afforded 
this right to respond to criticisms of them.  
Chief Justice Hinkson’s reasons do not consider whether the 
complainants’ exclusion from the civil trial left gaps in the factual record 
before him. Crown counsel Michael Luchenko died before the civil trial 
commenced, and accordingly did not give evidence regarding his work 
on the Henry prosecution. Within the damages decision, Luchenko 
shoulders much of the blame.105 Chief Justice Hinkson’s reasoning offers 
a straightforward narrative of a wrongful conviction being caused by a 
Crown lawyer acting in a manner that was improper when judged by the 
standards of the day, aided by a group of untrustworthy sexual assault 
complainants. When one compares these reasons against those offered by 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 2010 when it acquitted Henry 
and against the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2015 decision, one is left 
with the impression that the “story” of the Henry case and the array of 
material issues is almost endlessly malleable. One common thread 
throughout these judicial processes, however, is that the complainants 
have never been given an opportunity to share their perspectives on the 
police investigation and trial process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conducting the research that forms the basis for this article,  
I learned that Henry’s trial proceeded while Thomas Sophonow was 
enduring the second of his three trials for the murder of Barbara Stoppel. 
That case also famously resulted in a wrongful conviction, and a lengthy 
inquiry conducted by retired Supreme Court of Canada Justice Peter 
Cory.106 Justice Cory’s report explores, among other salient issues, the 
role of police tunnel vision, the frailties of eyewitness identification 
evidence, disclosure obligations, alibi evidence, and the proper basis on 
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which compensation should be awarded to a wrongly convicted person 
who has spent a lengthy period in prison.  
Justice Cory recommended the establishment of an independent post-
conviction review entity along the lines of the U.K. Criminal Cases 
Review Commission. He concluded that his approach to recommending 
compensation for Sophonow should be informed by Sophonow’s 
demonstrable innocence.107 Justice Cory’s report also considers the harm 
done to Stoppel’s family by Sophonow’s wrongful conviction. He 
recommended that Manitoba compensate the Stoppel family “for the pain 
and suffering that has been occasioned to the family by the wrongful 
conviction and imprisonment of Thomas Sophonow”.108  
The Sophonow case differs from Henry. Sophonow was able to 
demonstrate his factual innocence, thereby relieving Cory J. of the 
difficult task of deciding whether and where to place the burden of 
demonstrating underlying factual guilt or innocence, and with what 
consequences for quantum. Sophonow’s time in prison was much shorter 
than Henry’s. However, perhaps most importantly, Sophonow’s entitlement 
to compensation was adjudicated through an Inquiry process that was 
sufficiently flexible to attend to the systemic causes of wrongful 
conviction as well as the particular effects of this wrongful conviction on 
Sophonow and on the victim’s family.  
The evolution of Henry v. British Columbia as a civil claim for Charter 
damages both narrowed and distorted the range of interests to which the 
Court had regard in determining just compensation. Ultimately, Hinkson 
C.J.S.C. rejected the proposition that Henry is a public law case. In his 
ruling denying standing to Vancouver Rape Relief, he characterized the 
case as “private litigation between the two remaining parties, albeit one a 
government actor”.109 
In this article, I have traced the ways in which the narrowing and 
distortion of issues over the passage of the Henry case diverted the 
Court’s attention from some important questions. Before Hinkson 
C.J.S.C., the question of factual innocence appears to have been 
transformed from a difficult, but potentially relevant, consideration in 
assessing quantum to an irrelevant and perhaps assumed fact. This 
transformation seemingly happened without careful attention to the 
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relationship between criminal responsibility and constitutional rights. 
Even more concerning, as the Henry case evolved, attempts to pay 
attention to the Charter rights and interests of the complainants were 
completely sidelined. The fears that the complainants expressed about 
their safety and dignity and about the adverse effects of public attention 
largely went unheard. In Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s decision, the complainants 
are depicted as untrustworthy witnesses, despite the fact that they were 
not given the usual opportunity to respond to such characterization. 
Reconstructed as private litigation, the Henry trial ultimately denied 
the complex and multidimensional approach to Charter rights that is 
contemplated by cases such as Mills and O’Connor. The evolution of this 
trial process demonstrates the extent to which an adversarial trial model 
predicated on an antagonistic relationship between a self-interested state 
party (which was conceived by the trial judge as an essentially private 
actor) and a self-interested individual plaintiff permitted both state and 
court to abdicate their responsibility to protect sexual assault complainants’ 
privacy and dignity. The course of the Henry case also illustrates the 
inadequacies of Canada’s ad hoc approach to reviewing and determining 
compensation for wrongful convictions. The Sophonow Inquiry 
demonstrates that, with good terms of reference and sensitive leadership, 
it is possible for an inquisitorial process to avoid the either/or choices 
that the Henry Court perceived itself to face. The wrongly convicted, 
sexual assault complainants and the Canadian public deserve better from 
the process of reviewing a wrongful conviction. 
  
